Game Analysis on Line Self-Reliance Pricing in Foreign Trade
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Abstract.At present, a prominent phenomenon in China's economic life is the coexistence of price war and line self-reliance pricing. The price cartel formed by the homogeneous enterprises participating in export from China shows that the result of the behavior of pursuing profit maximization of export enterprises is bound to fall into the "prisoner's dilemma" . In the absence of external coercion enterprises can depend on each other still can not get out of the dilemma; If the promised action of the penalty clause can be trusted then there will be a cooperative equilibrium; Advantageous firms can also promote the emergence of cooperative equilibrium.
Keywords.
Foreign trade; Price cartel; Game analysis; Line self-Reliance pricing.
APA Citation
Yan Liu, Yang Lei (2024). Game Analysis on Line Self-Reliance Pricing in Foreign Trade. Frontiers in Humanities and Social Sciences, 4(2), 166-170. https://doi.org/10.54691/j6dcsh91
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